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Abstract
Social choice is replete with various settings including single-winner voting,
multi-winner voting, probabilistic voting, multiple referenda, and public de-
cision making. We study a general model of social choice called Sub-Committee
Voting (SCV) that simultaneously generalizes these settings. We then focus
on sub-committee voting with approvals and propose extensions of the justified
representation axioms that have been considered for proportional representa-
tion in approval-based committee voting. We study the properties and relations
of these axioms. For each of the axioms, we analyse whether a representative
committee exists and also examine the complexity of computing and verifying
such a committee.
Keywords: Social choice theory, justified representation, committee voting,
voting
1. Introduction
Social choice is a general framework of preference aggregation in which vot-
ers express preferences over outcomes and a desirable outcome is selected based
on the preferences of the voters [1, 9]. The most classic model of social choice
is (single winner) voting in which voters express preferences over a set of al-
ternatives and exactly one alternative is selected [5]. A natural generalization
of the model is muti-winner voting or committee voting in which a set of al-
ternatives is selected [12]. Another model is multiple referenda in which voters
vote over multiple but independent binary decisions [6]. Probabilistic versions
of single-winner voting have also been examined [16].
In this paper, we study a natural model of social choice that simultaneously
generalizes all the social choice settings mentioned above. The advantage of
considering a more general combinatorial model [19] is that instead of coming
up with desirable axioms, rules, and algorithms in a piecemeal manner for dif-
ferent settings, one can design or apply general principles and approaches that
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may be compelling for a wide range of settings. Of course certain axioms may
only be meaningful for a certain subsetting but as we show in this paper, a
positive algorithmic or axiomatic result for well-justified axioms can be viewed
favourably for all relevant sub-settings as well. Another advantage of formalis-
ing a general model is that it provides an opportunity to unify different strands
of work in social choice. Our model also helps approach the committee voting
problem in which there are additional diversity constraints possibly relating to
gender, race or skill. Finally, our model applies to general participatory bud-
geting scenarios [8] where multiple decisions needs to be made and the minority
representation needs to be protected.
After formalizing the SCV (sub-committee voting) setting, we focus on a
particular restriction of SCV in which agents or voters only express approvals
over some of the alternatives or candidates. The restriction to approvals is
desirable because approvals capture dichotomous/binary preferences that are
prevalent in many natural settings. Secondly, ordinal and cardinal preferences
coincide when preferences are dichotomous. This is desirable since elicitation
of cardinal utilities has been considered controversial in decisions concerning
public goods.
SCV with approvals can be viewed as a multidimensional generalization of
approval-based committee voting [17]. For approval-based committee voting, a
particularly appealing axiom that captures representation is justified represen-
tation (JR) that requires that a set of voters that is large enough and cohesive
enough in their preferences should get at least one approved candidate in the
selected committee. The axiom has received considerable attention [7, 20, 21].
For SCV with approvals, we extend the justified representation axiom [2] that
has only been studied in the context of committee voting.
One interesting application captured by this SCV framework, which is not
possible under standard models, is committee voting in the presence of diver-
sity constraints or quotas. Considering this application highlights the conflict
between diversity constraints and the original axioms of fair, or justified, rep-
resentation. As will be shown this conflict leads to conceptual issues of what
is the ‘appropriate’ generalisation of the JR axiom for SCV instances and also
technical issues such as existence and computational intractability of achieving
certain axioms whilst diversity constraints are enforced.
Contributions. Our contributions are threefold with the first two being concep-
tual contributions.
Firstly, we study a natural model of social choice called SCV (sub-committee
voting) that simultaneously generalizes several previously studied settings.
Secondly, we focus on approval-based SCV and present new notions of jus-
tified representation (JR) concepts including Intra-wise JR (IW-JR) and Span-
wise JR (SW-JR). These distinct notions lead to ‘local’ and ‘global’ approaches
to representation, respectively.
Thirdly, we present technical results concerning the extent to which these
properties can be satisfied. We show that although SW-JR is a natural exten-
sion of JR to the SCV setting, a committee satisfying SW-JR may not exist
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even under severe restrictions. Furthermore, checking whether there exists a
committee satisfying SW-JR is NP-complete. The results always show that the
more general setting SCV is considerably more challenging than approval-based
committee voting. We then formalize a weakening of SW-JR called weak-SW-
JR and present a polynomial-time algorithm that finds a committee that si-
multaneously satisfies weak-SW-JR and IW-JR. We also propose two natural
generalizations of PAV (Proportional Approval Voting), a well-known rule for
committee voting under approvals. However we show that neither of these two
extensions satisfies both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR.
2. Sub-committee Voting
We propose a new setting called SCV that generalizes a number of voting
models. The setting is a tuple (N,C, π, q,%)
• N = {1, . . . n} is the set of voters/agents.
• C = {c1, . . . , cm} is the set of candidates.
• π = {C1, . . . , Cℓ} is a partitioning of the candidates. Each Cj is referred
to as a candidate subset from which a sub-committee is to be chosen.
• q is the quota function that specifies the number of candidates q(Cj) = kj
to be selected from each subset Cj . We denote
∑ℓ
j=1 kj by k.
• % = (%1, . . . ,%n) specifies for each agent i, her preferences/utilities over
C. We allow the possibility that an agent does not compare candidates
across candidate subsets. At a minimum it is required that each %i is tran-
sitive and complete within each subset Cj , however additional restrictions
can be introduced, as befitting the setting; they might even be replaced
with cardinal utilities
An SCV outcome p specifies a real number p(c) for each c ∈ C with the
following constraints:
0 ≤ p(c) ≤ 1 for all c ∈ C∑
c∈C
p(c) = k and
∑
c∈Cj
p(c) = kj for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
In this paper we restrict our attention to discrete outcomes so that p(c) ∈
{0, 1} but in general SCV can allow for probabilistic outcomes where p(c) is the
probability of selecting candidate c. For discrete outcomes, an outcome W will
be a committee of size k that consists of ℓ sub-committees W1, . . . ,Wℓ where
each Wj ⊆ Cj and |Wj | = kj .
If ℓ = 1, p(c) ∈ {0, 1} for all c ∈ C and k = 1, we are in the voting setting. If
ℓ = 1, p(c) ∈ {0, 1} for all c ∈ C, we are in the committee/multi-winner voting
setting [12]. If ℓ = 1 and k = 1, we are in the probabilistic voting setting [16].
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If p(c) ∈ {0, 1} for all c ∈ C and ki = 1 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, we are in the
public decision making setting [10]. Note that public decision making setting
is equivalent to the “voting on combinatorial domain” setting studied by Lang
and Xia [19]. The latter setting allows for more complex preferences over the
set of combinatorial outcomes but the preferences may not be polynomial in the
number of candidates and voters. If p(c) ∈ {0, 1} for all c ∈ C and ki = 1 for all
i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ} and |Cj | = 2 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}, we are in the multiple-referenda
setting [6, 18, 11].
Sub-committee
Voting
Public
Decision
Making
Multiple
Referenda
Resource
Allocation
Multi
Winner
Voting
Single
Winner
Voting
Figure 1: Relations between settings. An arrow from (A) to (B) denotes that setting (A) is a
restriction of setting (B).
At a very abstract level, even a bicameral legislature can be viewed as an
SCV setting in which ℓ = 2. Even if there are no explicit multiple committees,
there can be diversity constraints imposed on the committee that can be easily
modelled as an SCV problem. For example, the problem of selecting five people
with 3 women and 2 men can be viewed as an SCV problem with two candidate
subsets.
In this paper, we will focus exclusively on approval-based voting in the SCV
setting. In approval-based voting we replace each agent i’s preference %i with
an approval ballot Ai ⊆ C which represents the subset of candidates that she
approves. The list A = (A1, . . . , An) of approval ballots is referred to as the
ballot profile. As per the general SCV setting introduced at the start of the
section, the goal is to select a target k number of candidates from C which
satisfy the quota function for each candidate subset.
3. Justified Representation in Approval-based Sub-committee Voting
We now focus on the SCV setting in which each agent approves a subset
of the candidates. Based on the approvals, the goal is to identify a fair or
representative outcome. Note that if ℓ = 1, we are back in the committee
voting setting. The approval-based SCV setting can be seen as capturing ℓ
independent committee voting settings.
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For the approval-based committee voting setting, justified representation
(JR) is a desirable property.
Definition 1 (Justified representation (JR)). Given a ballot profile A =
(A1, . . . , An) over a candidate set C and a target committee size k, we say
that a set of candidates W of size |W | = k satisfies justified representation for
(A, k) if ∀X ⊆ N :
|X | ≥
n
k
and | ∩i∈X Ai| ≥ 1 =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ 1)
One natural extension of JR to the case of SCV is to treat each candidate
subset as an independent committee voting problem. Then an SCV outcome
satisfies Intra-wise JR (IW-JR) if each sub-committee satisfies JR.
Definition 2 (Intra-wise JR (IW-JR)). An SCV outcomeW satisfies Intra-wise
JR (IW-JR) if ∀X ⊆ N and ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}:
|X | ≥
n
kj
and |(∩i∈XAi) ∩ Cj | ≥ 1
=⇒ (|W ∩ Cj ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ 1)
We note that since a committee satisfying JR can always be attained by a
polynomial-time algorithm [2], IW-JR is easy to achieve by treating each sub-
committee voting as a separate committee voting problem.
The limitation of this approach is that it could be that each time the same
voters are unrepresented in each sub-committee and they may ask for some
representation in at least some sub-committee. Thus IW-JR can be considered
as a ‘local’ JR axiom which ignores whether or not a given voter has already
been represented in some other sub-committee.
In view of this limitation, another extension of JR to the case of SCV is
to impose a JR-type condition across all sub-committees.1 The definition of
SW-JR is identical to the definition of JR for the committee voting setting.
Definition 3 (Span-wise JR (SW-JR)). An SCV outcome W satisfies Span-
wise JR (SW-JR) if ∀X ⊆ N :
|X | ≥
n
k
and |(∩i∈XAi)| ≥ 1 =⇒ (|W ∩ (∪i∈XAi)| ≥ 1)
This approach to representation leads to a ‘global’ JR axiom which aims
to represent large, cohesive groups of voters (i.e. X ⊆ N : |X | ≥ n/k and
∩i∈XAi 6= ∅) in some sub-committee, but not necessarily a sub-committee where
they are cohesive.
Note that both SW-JR and IW-JR concern representation that are not at
the level of single individual but at the level of large enough cohesive groups.2
Next we show that a SW-JR committee may not exist and is NP-hard to
compute.
1Imposing representation requirements across all sub-committees implicitly assumes that
the selections of all sub-committees are of comparable significance to the voters.
2In a related paper, Conitzer et al. [10] proposed fairness concepts for Public Decision
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4. (Non)-existence and complexity of SW-JR committees
We show that a committee satisfying SW-JR may not exist under either of
the two restriction (1) there are exactly two candidate subsets, and (2) ki = 1
for all i ∈ {1, . . . , ℓ}.
Proposition 1. A committee satisfying SW-JR may not exist even if there are
exactly two candidate subsets and ki = 1 for i = 1, 2.
Proof. Consider an SCV instance where |N | = n = 2, C = C1 ∪ C2 with
C1 = {a1, a2} and C2 = {b1, b2}, and k1 = k2 = 1. Note that n/k = 1.
If the approval ballots are A1 = {a1} and A2 = {a2}, then there is no SCV
outcome W (i.e. a committee) which satisfies SW-JR. This can be immediately
observed since SW-JR requires both voters to be represented, however the quota
k1 = 1 prevents this from being possible.
The reader may note that above proof utilises an example where the voters
have ballots which do not approve of any voter in some candidate subset (i.e.
Ai ∩ C2 = ∅). This feature is not required to show the non-existence of an
SW-JR committee however, it greatly simplifies the example.
Above we proved that a committee satisfying SW-JR may not exist. One
could still aim to find such a committee whenever it exists. Next we prove
that the problem of checking whether a SW-JR committee exists or not is NP-
complete.
Proposition 2. Checking whether an SW-JR committee exists or not is NP-
complete.
To show that checking whether a SW-JR committee exists is NP-complete we
will reduce a given instance of the Set Cover problem, a known NP-complete
problem [15], to an SCV instance - such that an SW-JR committee exists if
and only if the Set Cover instance has a yes answer.
Below is a statement of the Set Cover problem.
Set Cover
Input: Ground set X of elements, a collection L = {S1, . . . , St}
of subsets of X such that X = ∪tj=1Sj and an integer k
′.
Question: Does there exist a H ⊂ L such that |H | ≤ k′ and X =⋃
Sj∈H
Sj
To build intuition for the formal proof, which follows, we provide an overview
of the reduction.
Making that is equivalent to SCV in which ki = 1 for each i. They considered different
fairness notions that are based on proportional or envy-free allocations. The concepts involve
viewing agents independently and are different from proportional representation concerns.
When the number of sub-committees is less than the number of voters, the concepts they
consider are trivially satisfied.
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The Set Cover problem involves answering whether or not there exists
a collection of at most k′ subsets H ⊆ L which cover another set X . This
problem can be embedded into an SCV instance by letting the set X represent
the set of voters and considering a candidate subset C2 such that each element
denotes an element of L ; that is,
C2 = {s1, . . . , st}.
We then let each element of C2, say sj , be approved by voters i ∈ N = X if and
only if i ∈ Sj. By appropriately defining quota values and voter approval ballots
on the remaining candidate subset C1 it is shown that an SW-JR committee
exists if and only if every voter is represented via a candidate in C2 – this of
course possible if and only if we have a yes-instance of the Set Cover problem
A formal proof is presented below.
Proof. We reduce a given Set Cover instance (X,L , k′) to an SCV instance
as follows: Let
N = X = {1, . . . , n}
C = C1 ∪ C2
= {a1, . . . , an} ∪ {s1, . . . , st}
denote the set of voters, candidate set and partition into two candidate subsets.
Let voter approval ballots be
Ai = {sj|i ∈ Sj},
and k1 = n, k2 = k
′. Without loss of generality we may assume that t ≥ k′,
also note that k = n+ k′ and so n/k < 1.
Since every voter has a non-empty approval ballot (i.e. N = X = ∪tj=1Sj)
and n/k < 1, a committee satisfies SW-JR if and only if every voter is repre-
sented.
If (X,L , k′) is a yes-instance of the Set Cover problem then these exists
a subset H with |H | = k′ such that N = X =
⋃
Sj∈H
Sj – it follows that the
committee
W = C1 ∪ {si |Si ∈ H},
is a solution to the SCV problem and satisfies SW-JR. Conversely, if W is an
SW-JR committee then the set
H = {Si | si ∈W},
provides a yes-instance to the Set Cover problem.
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5. Weak-SW-JR
In the previous section we showed that a committee satisfying SW-JR need
not exist, and checking whether it does is NP-complete. Naturally and in the
pursuit of a computationally tractable representation axiom we weaken the con-
cept of SW-JR. In this section we present a weak version of SW-JR, appropri-
ately referred to as weak-SW-JR. An SCV outcome satisfying weak-SW-JR is
guaranteed to exist and is attainable via a polynomial-time algorithm.
Definition 4 (Weak-SW-JR). An SCV outcome W satisfies weak-Span-wise
Justified Representation (weak-SW-JR) if
∀X ⊆ N : |X | ≥
n
k
and
∣∣∣( ⋂
i∈X
Ai
)
∩ Cj
∣∣∣ ≥ 1 for all j
=⇒
∣∣∣W ∩ ( ⋃
i∈X
Ai
)∣∣∣ ≥ 1
Informally speaking, the weak-SW-JR axiom captures the idea that if a
“large”, cohesive set of voters unanimously support at least one candidate in
each candidate subset then they require representation in some sub-committee.
First observe that weak-SW-JR is indeed a (strict) weakening of the SW-JR
concept.
Proposition 3. SW-JR implies Weak-SW-JR. But weak-SW-JR does not imply
SW-JR.
Proof. We prove the proposition via the contrapositive, suppose weak-SW-JR
does not hold. Then there exists a set X ⊆ N such that |X | ≥ n/k with
Ai ∩W = ∅ for all i ∈ X and (
⋂
i∈X Ai) ∩ Cj 6= ∅ for all j = 1, . . . , ℓ. But
∅ 6=
( ⋂
i∈X
Ai
)
∩ Cj ⊆
( ⋂
i∈X
Ai
)
and so SW-JR does not hold.
The second claim can be easily observed from the definition and simple
counter examples can be constructed (for an example see within the proof of
Proposition 4 in the supplement material).
The next proposition states that for a given SCV instance there may be three
distinct committees W satisfying, respectively, weak-SW-JR but not IW-JR,
IW-JR but not weak-SW-JR, and both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR simultaneously.
That is, the weak-SW-JR and IW-JR representation axioms are distinct but are
not mutually exclusive (the proof can be found in the supplement material).
Proposition 4. Weak-SW-JR does not imply IW-JR and IW-JR does not imply
weak-SW-JR. Also weak-SW-JR and IW-JR are not mutually exclusive concepts.
Proof. We provide an example of an SCV instance which admits three distinct
SCV outcomes which satisfy
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(i) weak-SW-JR but not IW-JR
(ii) IW-JR but not weak-SW-JR
(iii) both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR.
Consider the SCV with |N | = 12,
C = C1 ∪C2,
where C1 = {c1, . . . , c7}, C2 = {a, b, c}, k1 = 1 and k2 = 2. Let the approval
ballots of each voter be as follows
Ai =


{ci, a} if i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
{c7, b} if i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10}
{c8, c} if i ∈ {11, 12}
First observe that for an SCV outcome W to satisfy weak-SW-JR the only
set of voters which must be represented is X = {7, 8, 9, 10} since they are a the
only group of size greater or equal to n/k = 4 who unanimously support a voter
in each of the candidate subsets i.e. c7 ∈ C1 and b ∈ C2 are approved by every
voter i ∈ X .
Whilst, for an SCV outcome to satisfy IW-JR it is required that the group
X ′ = {1, 2, . . . , 6} are represented in C2 by candidate a ∈ C2. This is because
X ′ is the only group of size greater or equal to n/k2 = 6 who unanimously
support a candidate in C2.
Thus it follows immediately that there exists three distinct SCV outcomes
which satisfy the three properties stated at the beginning of this proof, namely;
Wweak-SW-JR = {c1, b, c}
satisfies weak-SW-JR but not IW-JR,
W IW-JR = {c1, a, c}
satisfies IW-JR but not weak-SW-JR and,
Wweak-SW-JR and IW-JR = {c7, a, c}.
satisfies both IW-JR and weak-SW-JR.
6. An Algorithm for weak-SW-JR and IW-JR
The previous sections have introduced two appealing representation axioms,
weak-SW-JR and IW-JR, which capture distinct notions of representation or
fairness. The former axiom considers the structure of approvals across all can-
didate subsets, whilst the latter axiom considers each candidate subset as an
independent event. This section will combine these two axioms and consider
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SCV outcomesW which satisfy both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR. We prove that a
committee satisfying both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR is guaranteed to exists for
every SCV setting and such a committee can be computed in polynomial-time.
We begin by presenting the following intermediate fact before providing a
constructive existence proof of a committee which satisfies weak-SW-JR and
IW-JR.
Lemma 1. Let {kj}ℓj=1 be a sequence of positive numbers and {k
′
j}
ℓ
j=1 be a
sequence of non-negative numbers. Then,
ℓ∑
j=1
k′j∑ℓ
i=1 ki
≤ max
j∈[ℓ]
{k′j
kj
}
.
Proof. Let M = maxj∈[ℓ]
{
k′j
kj
}
and let wj =
kj∑
i ki
, then
M =
∑
j
wjM ≥
∑
j
wj
k′j
kj
=
∑
j
k′j∑
i ki
, as required.
Input: SCV instance (N,C, π, q,%)
Output: Committee W that satisfies both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR.
1 Wj = ∅ for j = 1, . . . , ℓ, W =
⋃
jWj
2 For each candidate subset j = 1, . . . , ℓ, allocate the candidates with support
≥ n/kj from highest to lowest in support, removing the support of voters
who are already represented in Wj =W ∩Cj .
3 From the remaining positions, consider unelected candidates who have sup-
port ≥ n/k among the unrepresented voters. Allocate these from highest
to lowest in support removing the support of voters who are already repre-
sented in W .
4 If there are remaining positions allocate in any way.
Algorithm 1: Algorithm that returns a committee which satisfies both weak-
SW-JR and IW-JR.
Proposition 5. A committee which satisfies both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR al-
ways exists and can be attained via Algorithm 1.
Proof. Consider Algorithm 1. We argue that the committee W returned by
Algorithm 1 satisfies both weak-SW-JR and IW-JR.
First we show that IW-JR is satisfied. Suppose not, then during step 2
for some j we allocated kj winning spots but failed to represent a group, say
X ⊆ N , of size at least n/kj who unanimously supports some candidate(s) in
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Cj . However, at each stage at least n/kj additional voters are represented and
so it must be the case that at least kjn/kj = n voters were represented in W .
That is, all voters have been represented which contradicts the existence of the
set X . Thus IW-JR is always satisfied.
Now we show that weak-SW-JR is also satisfied. Suppose that after step 2,
|Wj | = k′j < kj for all j – if this were not the case then weak-SW-JR is trivially
satisfied since all voters would then be represented inW . The proof now reduces
to showing that there are enough ‘places’ left in W after allocating the
∑
j k
′
j
places in Step 2.
In the ‘worst case’ every allocation for each j represents the same subset
of voters – in this case W represents ≥ R := maxj{k′j
n
kj
} voters with
∑
j k
′
j
elected candidates. But then there are
≤
n−R
n/k
=
n− nmaxj{
k′j
kj
}
n/k
= k
(
1−max
j
{k′j
kj
})
possible mutually exclusive groups of size ≥ n/k which are unrepresented in W .
In the worst case, each of these groups would unanimously support a different
candidate in every candidate subset and so correspond to a problem set with
respect to weak-SW-JR. Recall that we have k −
∑
j k
′
j winning spots left and
so suffices to show that
k −
∑
j
k′j ≥ k
(
1−max
j
{k′j
kj
})
. (1)
Note that we use the property that if problem set X exists they must unani-
mously support some candidate in every sub-committee and so we can ignore the
quota issues. Finally, (1) follows immediately from dividing by k and applying
Lemma 1.
7. Testing Representation
Testing for SW-JR and IW-JR are easy given the polynomial-time testing
of JR. Testing for weak-SW-JR is more involved, we conjecture the complexity
is coNP-complete. Before we proceed, we outline the standard approval-based
voting setting and an algorithm identified by Aziz et al. [2] to test JR.
Polynomial-time algorithm to verify JR
The standard setting of approval-based voting (AV) is a special case of SCV.
In particular, an AV instance is a tuple (N,C, k,A) where N is a set of voters, C
is the set of candidates, k is a positive integer and A is an approval ballot profile.
An AV outcome (or committee) is a subset W ⊆ C such that |W | = k. Note,
that this is simply a special case of SCV when ℓ = 1, C1 = C and q(C1) = k.
The algorithm proposed by Aziz et al. [2] to test JR is as follows: given an
Approval Voting instance (N,C, k,A) and outcomeW , for each candidate c ∈ C
compute
s(c) =
∣∣{i ∈ N : c ∈ Ai, Ai ∩W = ∅}∣∣.
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The set W fails to provide JR for (A, k) if and only if there exists a candidate
c with s(c) ≥ n/k.
With minor modifications, the above algorithm provides a polynomial-time
algorithm to test whether an SCV outcome satisfies SW-JR and IW-JR.
Proposition 6. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a given committee
satisfies SW-JR or not.
Proof. Same as the polynomial-time algorithm for testing JR.
Proposition 7. It can be checked in polynomial time whether a given committee
satisfies IW-JR or not.
Proof. First note that an SCV outcome W satisfies IW-JR if and only if it
satisfies JR for every candidate subset Ci when approvals ballots are restricted
to Ci. That is, W satisfies IW-JR if and only if the Approval Voting instance
(N,Ci, ki, A) satisfies JR for all i ∈ [ℓ].
It follows immediately that applying the polynomial-time algorithm to ver-
ify that JR is satisfied in each of these ℓ Approval Voting instances is also a
polynomial-time algorithm.
8. Generalizing PAV to SCV
In the setting of approval-based multi-winner voting, the Proportional Ap-
proval Voting (PAV) rule has been extensively studied and shown to satisfy
many desirable representation properties. It has been shown in [2] that PAV
committees satisfy JR, though computing a PAV committee is NP-hard.3
Under PAV in the standard approval voting setting (AV), each voter who
has j of their approved candidates in the committee W is assumed to derive
utility of r(j) :=
∑j
p=1 1/p if j > 0 and zero otherwise. The total utility of a
committee W is then defined as
PAV(W ) =
∑
i∈N
r(|W ∩ Ai|),
this is known as the PAV-score. The PAV rule outputs the committee W of size
k which maximizes the PAV-score among all committees of size k.
In this section we consider generalizing the PAV rule to the SCV setting.
This leads to two distinct PAV rules for the SCV setting which are both natural
generalizations.
Span-wise PAV (SW-PAV) is a generalization of the PAV rule which
assumes voters gain utility solely from the number of their approved candidates
3In fact PAV is viewed as one of the most compelling rules for approval-based committee
voting because it satisfies EJR a property stronger than JR [2].
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in W . Thus, each voter i derives utility r(|W ∩ Ai|) and the SW-PAV score of
a committee W is
SW-PAV(W ) =
∑
i∈N
r(|W ∩Ai|).
Intra-wise PAV (IW-PAV) is a generalization of the PAV rule which
assumes voters gain utility from both the number of their approved candidates
in W and also the diversity across sub-committees. Thus each voter i derives
utility
ρ(|W ∩ Ai|) :=
∑
j∈[ℓ]
r(|W ∩ Ai ∩Cj |),
and the IW-PAV score of a committee W is
IW-PAV(W ) =
∑
i∈N
ρ(|W ∩ Ai|) =
∑
j∈[ℓ]
∑
i∈N
r(|W ∩ Ai ∩ Cj |).
In both generalizations, a SW-PAV (IW-PAV) committee is defined to be a
committeeW satisfying the SCV quota conditions and maximizing the SW-PAV
(IW-PAV) score.
To illustrate the distinction between SW-PAV and IW-PAV the following
example is provided.
Example 1. Consider a voter i with approved and elected candidates {a, b, c}
such that {a, b} ∈ C1 and c ∈ C3. Then voter i’s contribution to the SW-PAV
score is
r(|W ∩ Ai|) = 1 +
1
2
+
1
3
= 1
5
6
.
Whilst her contribution to the IW-PAV score is
ρ(|W ∩ Ai|) = r(2) + r(1) = 1 +
1
2
+ 1 = 2
1
2
.
Generalized Justified Representation under SW-PAV and IW-PAV.
We consider the representation properties of SCV committee outcomes from the
IW-PAV and SW-PAV rules. We show that IW-PAV satisfies IW-JR and SW-
PAV satisfies weak-SW-JR, whilst neither satisfies both. In addition, we show
that both rules can fail to output an SW-JR committee when such a committee
exists.
Proposition 8. IW-PAV satisfies IW-JR.
Proof. Any IW-PAV maximizing committee W must be such that for all i the
set W ∩Ci is a PAV maximizing committee in the standard AV setting. Hence
JR must be satisfied in each Ci, as shown in [2], thus IW-JR is satisfied.
We now show that SW-PAV satisfies weak-SW-JR, however first we intro-
duce some notation and a lemma.
LetW be an SCV committee and let c ∈W , define the marginal contribution
of c as
MC(c,W ) = SW-PAV(W )− SW-PAV(W − {c}).
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The following lemma was explicitly presented by Aziz and Huang [3] for the
standard approval voting setting and was implicitly used in [2]. The lemma
applies to the SCV setting via an identical argument. We omit the proof and
provide a reference.
Lemma 2. [Aziz and Huang [3]] For any committee W such that |W | = k,
there exists at least one c ∈ W such that
MC(c,W ) ≤ |{i ∈ N : Ai ∩W 6= ∅}|/k ≤ n/k.
Proposition 9. SW-PAV satisfies weak-SW-JR.
Proof. Suppose for the purpose of a contradiction that W ∗ is a SW-PAV com-
mittee which does not satisfy weak-SW-JR. That is, there exists a group of
unrepresented voters X with |X | ≥ n/k such that Ai ∩W ∗ = ∅ for all i ∈ X
and for all j ∈ [ℓ]
⋂
i∈X Ai ∩ Cj 6= ∅.
First, note that there must exist a candidate c ∈W ∗ such thatMC(c,W ∗) <
n/k. Suppose otherwise, then by Lemma 2 it must be that all n voters are
represented which contradicts the existence of the set X .
Now suppose that c ∈ Cj for some j ∈ [ℓ] and let c′ ∈ Cj such that c′ ∈⋂
i∈X Ai∩Cj . Then it is clear that adding c
′ to the committeeW ∗−{c} increases
the SW-PAV score by at least n/k and so
SW-PAV
(
(W ∗ − {c}) ∪ {c′}
)
> SW-PAV(W ∗),
which contradictsW ∗ being a SW-PAV committee. Thus, a SW-PAV committee
must satisfy weak-SW-JR.
The following proposition shows that both SW-PAV and IW-PAV can fail
to produce a SW-JR committee when such a committee exists. The proof illus-
trates a trade-off between maximizing voter utility and pursuing the represen-
tation axiom of SW-JR.
Proposition 10. Both SW-PAV and IW-PAV can fail SW-JR when a SW-JR
committee exists.
Proof. Consider the following counter-example. Let N = {1, . . . , 12},
C = C1 ∪C2 = {a, b, c} ∪ {a1, . . . , a5, b1, . . . , b5, c1},
and let the approval ballots be
Ai = {a, ai} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 5}
Ai = {b, bi−5} for all i ∈ {6, . . . , 10}
Ai = {c, c1} for all i ∈ {11, 12},
with quotas k1 = 1 and k2 = 2.
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For SW-JR to be satisfied we require that at least one voter from each of the
groups X = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5} and X ′ = {6, 7, 8, 9, 10} are represented in W . Thus,
the only committees satisfying SW-JR are of the following form:
W1 = {a, bi, bj} or W2 = {b, ai, aj} with i 6= j.
Any committee with the form above has an SW-PAV score of 7 and an IW-PAV
score of 7. However the committee W ∗ = {a, c1, b1} maximizes the SW-PAV
and IW-PAV scores, with both equal to 8, and does not satisfy SW-JR.
We now present two propositions showing that SW-PAV can fail to produce
a committee satisfying IW-JR, and IW-PAV can fail weak-SW-JR.
The proof of the following proposition highlights the conflict between SW-
PAV, which does not incentivize diversity, and IW-JR, which may demand rep-
resentation of a group already represented in another sub-committee.
Proposition 11. SW-PAV can fail to produce a committee satisfying IW-JR.
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , 12},
C = {a, b} ∪ {a′, b′} ∪ {a′′, b′′, c′′},
and let approval ballots be
Ai =


{a, a′, a′′} if i ∈ {1, . . . , 6}
{a, a′, b′′} if i ∈ {7, 8}
{a, a′, c′′} if i ∈ {9}
{b, b′, b′′} if i ∈ {10}
{b, b′, c′′} if i ∈ {11, 12}
with quotas k1 = k2 = 1 and k3 = 2.
The only candidate required to be in a candidate subset for IW-JR is candi-
date a′′ ∈ C3 := {a
′′, b′′, c′′} since 12/2 = 6. However, direct computation shows
that a maximal SW-PAV score is 15 56 attained from W
∗ = {a, a′, c′′}.
The following proposition shows that IW-PAV can fail weak-SW-JR. The
proof highlights the conflict between IW-PAV, which incentives diversity, and
weak-SW-JR, which may require a smaller unrepresented group of voters to be
represented.
Proposition 12. IW-PAV can fail to produce a committee satisfying weak-SW-
JR
Proof. Let N = {1, . . . , 12}, C = {a, b, c} ∪ {a′, b′, c′}, let approval ballots be
Ai = {a, a
′} for all i ∈ {1, . . . , 5},
Ai = {b, b
′} for all i ∈ {6, . . . , 9},
Ai = {c, c
′} for all i ∈ {10, 11, 12},
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with quotas k1 = k2 = 2 . Note n/k = 3.
For a weak-SW-JR committee every voter must be represented. However,
the IW-PAV committee is W ∗ = {a, b, a′, b′} which gives an IW-PAV score of
9× (1 + 1) = 18 and does not satisfy weak-SW-JR.
9. Discussion
In this paper we formalized a general social choice model called sub-
committee voting. We focussed on natural generalization of JR from the
approval-based committee voting setting to the approval-based SCV setting.
Some of the results are summarized in Table 1. It will be interesting to consider
generalizations of stronger versions of justified representation such as PJR and
EJR. For example, IW-JR can straightforwardly be strengthened to IW-PJR or
IW-EJR.
It will be interesting to consider more general preferences that need not be
approval-based. Several research questions that have been intensely studied in
subdomains of SCV apply as well to SCV. For example, it will be interesting
to extend axioms and rules for single-winner or multi-winner voting to that of
SCV.
Representative Complexity
committee of
exists computing
SW-JR No NP-c
IW-JR Yes in P
weak-SW-JR Yes in P
IW-JR & weak-SW-JR Yes in P
Table 1: Properties of justified representation concepts for sub-committee voting.
In any combinatorial setting, one can view the voting process as either si-
multaneous voting or sequential voting [4, 19, 14, 13]. We formalized SCV as a
static model in which ℓ sub-committees are to be selected simultaneously. The
representation notions that we formalized can also be considered if voting over
each sub-committee is conducted sequentially over time. The axioms that we
consider such as SW-JR apply as well to understand the quality of an outcome
in these online or sequential settings.
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